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The Influence of Sitting and Retired







Since the publication of the senior author's Justices and Presidents:
A Political History of Appointments to the Supreme Court' considerable
interest has been expressed regarding the degree and kind of involve-
ment that sitting and retired United States Supreme Court justices exer-
cise in the nomination and appointment of persons to fill vacancies on
the Court. The present article endeavors to examine that involvement,
detailing specifically not only its range and extent but also the methods
utilized by justices to exert pressure and the degree of their success.
Because of the surprising plentitude of such judicial involvement, our
essay constitutes a necessarily summary account rather than an individ-
ual examination of each instance.'
Perhaps because it was commonly taken for granted, given the
textbook conceptualization of the existence and application of the prin-
ciples and practices of the separation of powers, that sitting or even
retired justices would shun involvement in the highly political selectiQn
* Henry L. and Grace Doherty Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs,
University of Virginia.
t Doctoral Candidate in Constitutional Law and the Judicial Process, University
of Virginia.
1. H. ABRAHmm, JusTIcEs Aim PR sIDEN-s: A POLrrICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
mENrs TO THE SUPREME COURT (1974) [hereinafter cited as H. ABRAHAm].
2. The efforts of sitting and retired Supreme Court justices to influence the ap-
pointment of lower court judges are not covered in these pages, but they appear to be
similarly extensive. See, e.g., C. FAiRMAN, MR. JUSrICM MILLER AN TH SUPREME
COURT, 1862-1890, at 341, 370-71 (1939) [hereinafter cited as C. FAIRMAN]; C. SwisHER,
ROGER B. TANEY 438-40 (1935); Murphy, Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court
Bureaucracy-A Study in Judicial Administration, 24 J. POL. 460 (1962).
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process, very little formal research has been undertaken on the subject to
date.3 However, sprinkled throughout the literature on the history of
the Supreme Court and that of the biographies of some of its justices are
the patterns of Supreme Court decisionmaking, this figure includes
several incidents of pressure activity of the kind examined here. Some
works have discussed these activities in detail, others have merely
hinted at the existence of unexplored primary material. Our own
research methodology involved a thorough search of all pertinent sec-
ondary sources for chronicles of such incidents of pressure4 and an
examination of selected primary sources. In view of the unexpectedly
large number of verifiable instances uncovered, we compiled chart "A"
to identify the actors and the nature of their attempt to influence the
nomination and appointment processes. The chart does not document
the very common occurence of a justice's simple expression of a desire to
see a certain individual appointed to the Court. To be listed in the
chart a specific action on behalf of a candidate had to be undertaken by
a justice either voluntarily or at the request of the president or a member
of his administration, in an attempt to effectuate the desired selection.
For example, although it is generally known that Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr., desired to have Benjamin N. Cardozo succeed him to
the bench in 1932, we did not include it as one of the charted instances
of judicial pressure since Holmes took no action himself to influence
President Hoover's selection. Instead, he merely lent moral and intel-
lectual support to the efforts of Associate Justice Harlan F. Stone in that
case. Further, we consciously excluded from the chart mere "rumors"
of judicial pressure in favor of certain candidates, and relied exclusively
on examples documented by primary or secondary sources. Therefore,
for example, the rumors of letters written by Associate Justices Field
and/or Miller for their own elevation to the chief justiceship after the
deaths of Chief Justices Salmon P. Chase and Melville W. Fuller are not
recorded because, while it is beyond question that both men fervently
desired the posts,5 no hard evidence could be found of any specific
actions taken by them in their own behalf. Nor did we include efforts
3. Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Supreme Court Ap-
pointments, 1961 S. Cr. REv. 159-93, is one of the few such studies on the subject.
4. The biographical sources in H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRO-
DUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE
(3d ed. 1975) were used as a basis for this survey and yielded the information presented
in chart A.
5. F. FAI RAN, supra note 2, at 265; W. KING, MELVrLLE WEST FULLER, CHIEF
JUSTIcE OF THE UNITED STATES 1888-1910 (1950) [hereinafter cited as W. KING];
C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD, CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1969).
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to influence presidential action by individuals not yet on the Court, such
as Harlan F. Stone who, as attorney general, sponsored the Cardozo
appointment. 6 Because Stone later did so as a sitting associate justice
that action is, of course, listed.
I. Motivations of Justices
There are many possible -motives for the involvement of sitting or
retired justices in the appointment process of putative future justices. A
primary motivation of interceding justices may be their desire to see
presidents select colleagues who will be supportive of their own jurispru-
dential postures on major constitutional issues. Such was clearly true of
the efforts of Chief Justice Taft to influence Presidents Harding and
Coolidge in their Supreme Court nominations: Taft actively worked for
the appointments of "conservative" justices.7 The appointments of
future Justices Cardozo 8 and Tom C. Clark,9 and the efforts of sitting
Associate Justice Miller to have his candidates appointed ° are other
prime examples. Another motivating factor has been the feeling of pro-
fessional competence on the part of individual justices to judge the qual-
ifications of a Supreme Court nominee in contrast to the lack of judicial
expertise possessed by appointing presidents, none of whom except Taft
had ever served on the Court. Numerous efforts of retired and retiring
justices motivated by such concerns are documented." A third factor is
the natural concern of justices for the Court's continuing institutional
tradition and the maintenance of its high professional integrity. Here
the justice may see himself in the role of neutral and impartial adviser
cooling the political passions of the appointment process and directing
the president toward a worthy selectee. Stone's efforts when he was
6. Burlingham, Harlan Fiske Stone, 32 A.B.A.J. 322, 323 (1946).
7. Chief Justice Taft's recommendations for appointments to the Supreme Court
(and to the lower federal courts) were so highly respected by President Harding and his
attorney general, Harry Daugherty, that he was virtually able to shape the Court ac-
cording to his own ideological outlook. See generally D. DA NELs~i, A SUPREME COURT
JusIcE Is APPOINTED (1964); A. MASON, WILLIAM HowARD TAFT: CHIEF JuSTIcE
(1965); H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HowARD TAFT (1939); Murphy,
In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Supreme Court Appointments, 1961
S. CT. REv. 159-93.
8. Carmen, The Presdent, Politics, and the Power of Appointments: Hoover's
Nomination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 55 VA. L. REV. 616 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Carmen].
9. See R. ALLEN AND W. SHANNON, THE TRuMAN MERRY-Go-RouND 388
(1950); Dutton, Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark, 26 IND. L.J. 169 (1951).
10. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 2, at 15, 264, 339-44, 349-54, 384.
11. See, e.g., Frank, Supreme Court Justice Appointments: II, 1941 Wisc. L. REv.
343, 367.
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Footnotes for Chart A
1. L. FMRmMAN & F. ISRAEL, Tim JusTIcEs OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1789-1969, at 248 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL].
2. D. McHargue, Appointments to the Supreme Court, 1789-1932 77, May 1949
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation in University of California, Los Angeles Library) [here-
inafter cited as McHargue].
3. Id. at 85.
4. C. SWisHER, ROGER B. TANEY 311-12 (1935); Swisher, The Taney Period
1836-1864, in 5 OLIVEk WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HIsToRY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNIrED SATES 22-23 (1974).
5. C. SwlsHER, ROGER B. TANEY 313 (1935); K. UMBREIT, OUR ELEVEN CmIEF
JUSTCES 227 (1938).
6. R. NIcHoLs, FRANKLIN PIERCE: YOUNG HICKORY OF THE GRANITE HILs
253 (1931); H. O'CONNOR, JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL 17 (1920).
7. W. KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER: DAvrD DAVIS 192 (1960); Frank, The Ap-
pointment of Supreme Court Justices, 1941 Ws. L. REV. 178-79.
8. Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-1888, in 6 OLIVER WENDE.L
HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 11-12, 16-17 (1971); D. McHargue,
supra note 2, at 189.
9: D. SILVER, LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 191 (1956).
10. Fairman, supra note 8, at 12.
11. Id. at 14, 18.
12. Id. at 15; D. SILVER, LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 200-01.
13. C. FAiRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 1862-1890, at 339-
44 (1939) [hereinafter cited as C. FAIRMAN].
14. Fairman, supra note 8, at 719-27; Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment
to the Supreme Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L REv. 977, 990-99 passim
(1941); D. McHargue, supra note 2, at 222.
15. C. MAGRATH, MoamsON R. WArrE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 7 (1963),
D. McHargue, supra note 2, at 227.
16. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 13, at 264-75; B. PooRE, 2 REMINISCENCES OF SIXcY
YEARS IN THE NATIONAL MmoPoLis 299-301 (1886).
17. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 13, at 349-54.
18. Id. at 362.
19. Id. at 380-83.
20. B. TRimALE, CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE, DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST 140
(1938).
21. C. FAnMAN, supra note 13, at 384; F. LATHAM, THE GREAT DISSENTER: JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN 1833-1911, at 82 (1970) [hereinafter cited as F. LATHAM).
22. G. PARKER, RECOLLECTIONS OF GROVER CLEVELAND 367-68 (1911).
23. W. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNrrE) STATES
1888-1910, at 106 (1950) [hereinafter cited as W. KING].
24. F. LATHAM, supra note 21, at 84.
25. Note, Mr. Justice David Brewer, 22 WEEKLY L. BUL. 384 (1889).
26. Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices, 1941 Wisc. L REV. at
367-68; McHargue, supra note 2, at 313-14.
27. C. KENT, MEMOIR OF HENRY BILLINGS BROWN 28-29 (1915); W. KING, supra
note 23, at 180-81; F. LATHAM, supra note 21, at 85-86.
28. C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD, CRAFrSMAN OF THE LAw 444 (1969).
29. W. KINo, supra note 23, at 227-29.
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Footnotes for Chart A (continued)
30. D. McHargue, supra note 2, at 357-58.
31. W. KINq, supra note 23, at 284-86.
32. Murphy, Marshalling the Court: Leadership, Bargaining, and the Judicial Proc-
ess, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 640, 653 (1962).
33. C, KENT, supra note 27, at 33; D. McHargue, supra note 2, at 357-58.
34. L FRIEDMAN & F. IsRAEL, supra note 1, at 1815; 5 THE LETTERs OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT 368 (1951). R. Burke, The Path to the Court: A Study of Federal Judicial
Appointments (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation) (1958).
35. McHargue, President Taft's Appointments to the Supreme Court, 12 J. PoL.
486 (1950).
36. W. KING, supra note 23, at 309-10.
37. 2 A. BuTr, TAFT AND ROOSEVELT: THE INTIMATE LETrs OF ARCHIE BuTr,
MILITARY AIDE 438-39 (1930), McHargue, supra note 35, at 490-91.
38. 1 H. PRINGLE, TH LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOwARD TAFT 534-35 (1939).
See also 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LEnrERs: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 170 (1941) (indicates support of Holmes
only).
39. McHargue, supra note 35, at 492 n.51.
40. Id. at 500.
41. McHargue, supra note 2, at 442.
42- A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LiFE 513 (1946).
43. D. DANELSKr, A SUPREmE COURT JUsncE IS APPOINTED 29-35 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as D. DANELSEE]; A. MASON, WILLIAM HowARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE
158-60 (1964) [hereinafter cited as A. MAoN-Taft].
44. Murphy, In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft and Supreme Court Ap-
pointments, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 159, 167-77 [hereinafter cited as Murphy].
45. Id. at 168-69; D. DANELSEi, supra note 43, at 43.
46. D. DANELSKI, supra note 43, at 43; Murphy, supra note 44, at 168-69.
47. D. DANELSKI, supra note 43, at 43.
48. Id. at 47.
49. Id. at 78-44.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 84.
52. Id. at 49-50.
53. Id. at 82.
54. Id. at 129.
55. Murphy, supra note 44, at 179.
56. Id. at 180-81.
57. Id. at 178.
58. Id. at 177-79.
59. Id. at 177-83.
60. D. McHargue, supra note 2, at 452, 458.
61. A. MASON, HARLAN FIsKE STONE: PILLAR OF TnE LAw 300 (1956) [herein-
after cited as A. MASON-STONE]; 2 H. PRINGLE, supra note 38, at 1043; Murphy, supra
note 44, at 1,86-87.
62. A. MAsON, supra note 43, at 297-98; Carmen, The President, Politics, and the
Power of Appointments: Hoover's Nomination of Mr. Justice Cardozo, 55 VA. L. Rv.
616, 623 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Carmen].
63. A. MASON-TAFT, supra note 43, at 297-98.
64. Id.
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Footnotes for Chart A (concluded)
65. Carmen, supra note 62, at 638.
66. A. MASON--SToNE, supra note 61, at 300; Carmen, supra note 62, at 625.
67. Carmen, supra note 62, at 625; R. Burke, supra note 34, at 136.
68. 2 M. PusEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 650-51 (1951) [hereinafter cited as M.
PUSEY].
69. A. MASON-TAFT, supra note 43, at 278.
70. A. MASON-STONE, supra note 61, at 336; Carmen, supra note 62, at 637-38.
71. A. MASON--STONE, supra note 61, at 335.
72, Carmen, supra note 62, at 637-38.
73. Id. at 643.
74. W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: (THE EARLY YEARS) THE AuTroBioG-
RAPHY OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 449 (1974).
75. 2 H. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. IcrEs 550-52 (1954); A.
MASON-STONE, supra note 61, at 566.
76. E. GERHART, AMEICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 230 (1958) [herein-
after cited as E. GERHART]; A. MASON-STONE, supra note 61, at 566; 2 M. PUSEY,
supra note 68, at 787-88.
77. E. GERHART, supra note 76, at 230; A. MASON, supra note 61, at 566-67; 2 M.
PusEY, supra note 68, at 787-88.
78. A. MASON-STONE, supra note 61, at 592; Brant, Mr. Justice Rutledge The Man,
35 IowA L. REv. 559 (1950); Murphy, supra note 44, at 191 & n.127.
79. ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEm CORRESPONDENCE 1928-1945, at 671-75
(1967).
80. F. HARPER, JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION 25 (1965).
81. J. Ashby, Supreme Court Appointments Since 1937, at 159 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation at Notre Dame University Library, 1971).
82. 2 M. PUsEY, supra note 68, at 801-02.
83. E. GERHART, supra note 76, at 281.
84. Id. at 258; C. PRITCHETr, Tim ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES 1937-1947, at 26 (1969). But see J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK:
THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS 124-25 (1949).
85. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 74, at 458; F. RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL
IISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 298 (1955).
86. R. ALLEN AND W. SHANNON, THE TRUMAN MERRY-GO-ROUND 338 (1950);
Dutton, Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark, 26 IND. LIJ. 169 n.8 (1951).
87. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 22, 257 (1974).
88. Id. at 22.
89. J.E. CLAYTON, THE MAKING OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN ACTION 51
(1964).
90. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINT-
MENT TO THE SUPREME COURT 22, 257 (1974).
91. 4 L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 3118.
92. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 1969, at 31.
93. R. HARIUS, DECISION 173 (1971).
94. TIME, July 14, 1975, at 40; NEWSWEEK, Apr. 27, 1970, at 28-29; NEW YORK
TIMES, Apr. 15, 1970, col. 3, at 34.
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chief justice were in this vein. 2 A fourth motivation may simply be that
of friendship for the proposed candidate; friendship seems to have
prompted the actions of many nineteenth century justices. 3
Whatever the overriding or collective motivations may be, chart
"A" demonstrates that the number of justices involved in actively pres-
suring for Supreme Court appointments has been extensive and encom-
passes justices of widely diverse judicial philosophies and eras. Fully
forty-eight of the 101 individuals who have sat on the Supreme Court as
of this writing have exerted ascertainable pressure on behalf of some
candiate or some philosophy of judicial selection. Not at all surprising-
ly, given their interest in the appointment process and its influence on
the patterns of Supreme Court decisionmaking, this figure includes
eleven chief justices, with only Chief Justices Jay, Ellsworth, Rutledge
and Chase refraining from such direct activity. It should be noted that
efforts by the forty-eight justices were not directed toward just a few
appointments, but involved forty-three vacancies, comprehending rec-
ommendations for candidates in ninety-four separate instances. Since
some justices have obviously been particularly active, chart "B" was





Attempted Pressure in Presidential Selection of Future Justices
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE
JUSTICE ATTEMPTS SUCCESSES OF SUCCESS
Taftt 18 14** 77%
Stoneti 9 5 55%
Harlan I 6 5 83%
Hughest§ 6 4 67%
Miller 6 4 67%
Frankfurter 4 3 75%
Van Devanter 4 2 50%
Field 3 3 100%
Brown 3 3 100%
Warrent 3 2 67%
Bradley 3 2 67%
Day 3 2 67%
Burgert 3 1 33%
Swayne 3 0 0%
* Charts "B" through "E" were compiled from the information in chart "A".
** Does not include candidacies of John W. Davis and William Miller who, although
strongly backed by Taft, decided to withdraw from consideration for peisonal
reasons.
t Chief Justice.
§ Active attempts both as Chief Justice and Associate Justice.
12. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OI THE LAw passim (1956) [here-
inafter cited as A. MAsON].
13. W. KONG, supra note 5, at 180.
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Chart "B" demonstrates the extensiveness of involvement of several
of our chief justices and underscores what has been generally suspect-
ed:14  that Chief Justice Taft is the unquestioned leader among the
activist justices in the appointment influence game. Perhaps the most
surprising revelation, given his professed reluctance to become involved
in influencing the judicial selection process,'- is Chief Justice Stone's
ranking as the second most active justice therein. Because of the
considerable differences in method in the various recorded incidents of
judicial involvement, a closer examination of these is in order. -
II. Methods of Pressure
A simple list of the times a justice urged a candidate's appointment
cannot be complete without some examination of the type of pressure
he exerted. A plain letter of recommendation in favor of a candidate
written by a justice to the president cannot be, and is not, as important
or effective as the persistent pressure exerted by Chief Justice Taft, for
example, who resorted to letters, phone calls, personal visits, enlisted
other justices on behalf of his candiate, and secured sundry recommen-
dations from nonjudicial personnel for his favorites. 6 Further, it
makes a vast difference whether there is just one or several justices
pushing for a candidate. Accordingly, chart "C" details the types of
pressures and the frequency of their use by sitting and retired justices.
A crucial distinction should be made, in this examination of the
techniques of pressure, between justices acting to promote appointments
and those opposing them. Whether due to personal dislike of a candi-
date, dissatisfaction with his professional qualifications, or disagreement
with the candidate's personal or political philosophy, justices have lob-
bied against selections in eighteen of the ninety-four instances of pres-
sure-a significant number since many of these cases represented per-
sonal voluntary efforts by justices in their quest for what they regarded
as the preservation of the Court's integrity.
17
Another basic consideration cum distinction is whether a single
justice or several justices labor in support of, or in opposition to, the
candidate. Influence exerted by more than one justice is presumably
14. See note 7 supra.
15. Chief Justice Stone said in a letter to Charles C. Burlingame, "Despite your
persuasive plea. . . I feel that I should not volunteer my advice on the matter of judicial
appointments." A. MASON, supra note 12, at 592.
16. See generally H. PMINGLE, THE LIFE AND TMs OF WILLIAM HowARw TAFT:
A BrooGAPHY (1939); Murphy, note 3 supra.
17. See A. MASON, note 12 supra.
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CHART "C"
METHODS EMPLOYED BY JUSTICES TO PRESSURE
FOR APPOINTMENTS
METHOD
Simple letter of recommendation
Personal visit by justice to either
president or attorney general
Request, by president or attorney
general, to justice for information
or personal consultation with justice
Intensive lobbying efforts (letters,
phone calls, personal visits, all in
various combinations)
Simple approval of candidate already decided
on is requested of justice by president
Attempt by justice to "educate" the president
as to a particular philosophy of action,
not as to a particular candidate
Successor "Deal"
Justice sends letter plus packet of
other information on candidate
Justice secures recommendation for his candidate
from another person and sends it to. the president
Specific recommendation of a successor
Use of newspaper stories which are
planted and written about candidate
Sending of personal emissary for the justice himself













more persuasive than solitary action. On occasion, the entire body of
sitting justices has acted on behalf of a candidacy.' 8 Of nineteen
ascertainable instances in which more than one justice supported a
candidate, fifteen proved successful'-a telling manifestation of their
collective influence.
Letter of Recommendation
The most basic tactic used by justices is the simple letter of
recommendation pointing to the Court's needs and candidate's qualifi-
cations. Normally, these letters are written directly to the president,
although they are sometimes directed to others who are close to the chief
executive and whom a justice believes to be more influential than he.
20
Usually exerted very early in the selection process, the letter approach
18. This occurred in three instances over the history of the Court: the appoint-
ments of John A. Campbell (1853), Joseph P. Bradley (1869) and Horace Gray
(1881). See notes 6 supra & 21 infra; C. FAnut4, supra note 2, at 726; Fairman, Mr.
Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal Tender Cases, 54
HARv. L. REV. 977, 990-99 passim (1941).
19. See chart A supra.
20. Id.
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has often proved to be a low-key but effective mode of influence when
used alone.
Personal Visit
A more potent form of pressure might be expected to be a personal
visit by the justice to the president or, on occasion, to the attorney
general, if for no other reason than that the justice would appear to be
extending himself a bit further on the candidate's behalf than he would
with the dispatch of a simple letter. Surprisingly, however, this more
direct pressure has not resulted in a greater degree of success: recom-
mendations by justices made by letter and in person were both heeded in
precisely 50 percent of the cases.21
Requested Advice
Advice has been requested of sitting or retired justices by presi-
dents directly or through members of their administrations. Modes of
contact on this delicate subject have differed intriguingly. President
Taft dispatched his attorney general, George W. Wickersham, to consult
with the entire Court on a successor to Chief Justice Fuller in 1910.22
On another occasion, Associate Justice Harlan's opinion was sought by
President Theodore Roosevelt at a dinner party. 23 However, as a rule,
the entry of justices into the selection process in these instances came
later than it did when advice was volunteered, for the president or the
attorney general have normally settled on at least a group of candidates
from which they intend to choose before requesting justices' opinions of
persons already under consideration. Whereas the justice volunteering
a letter or personal visit is usually "suggesting" a name, or "placing a hat
in the ring," in these "advice-seeking" cases he often serves more to
confirm, deny or amplify information already in hand. Thus, even if the
justice's candidate is ultimately selected, his practical effect on the
selection process may have been at best marginal.
Request for Approval
At times, a justice is consulted after a choice has been made by the
president but before it is forwarded to the Senate for confirmation. Such
21. Seventeen of thirty-four attempts to persuade by letter and ten of twenty
attempts to persuade by personal visit resulted in success. See id.
22. W. KING, supra note 5, at 309-10; H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WiL-
LIAM HowARD TAFT 534-35 (1939).
23. But the query posed by the president in this case was a general one relating
to any vacancy which might occur in the future. Murphy, Marshalling the Court:
Leadership, Bargaining, and the Judicial Process, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 640, 653 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Murphy].
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a consultation customarily serves as a final check by the president to
protect himself against unwelcome surprises in the Senate confirmation
proceedings. In all such recorded instances, the consultations involved
selections favored by the sponsoring justices.24 No proof exists of the
results of any negative feedback of a presidentially consulted justice.
Actions by Retiring Justices
Justices who retire from the bench frequently take 'an active interest
in the choice of their successor whether it be for altruistic or egotistical
reasons. This pressure may take the shape of a simple "nomination" of
a successor by the retiring justice, as occurred in the case of Justice
Brandeis' successful recommendation of William 0. Douglas for his
position on the bench.25 A much more persuasive form of pressure,
however, is the "deal" characterized by a justice's avowed offer to retire
in favor of a particular candidate of his choice or at least of his approval.
Although this effort is not always successful, it is especially persuasive
when prospects are good that the president will have no selection at all if
the justice determines to survive the incumbent president's term. A
prime example of such a "successor deal" arrangement was Associate
Justice Field's retirement after thirty-four years on the bench. In a deal
actually sponsored and arranged by Associate Justice Brewer, Field's
nephew, Joseph McKenna was persuaded to resign from his life tenure
on the United States Circuit Court of Appeals to become attorney
general under newly elected President William McKinley. In return, he
was promised that Associate Justice Field would resign during McKin-
ley's term of office in favor of McKenna.26 Field evidently concurred in
this game-plan in order to assure California's continued "representation"
on the Court by a successor whose political and philosophical commit-
ments would be similar to his own.
2
Later developments underscored the potency of "successor deal"
arrangements. When Chief Justice Fuller felt compelled to oppose
McKenna's nomination in view of incontrovertible evidence, provided
by federal judges from California, attesting to McKenna's utter incom-
petence while serving on the circuit bench,28 Fuller's effort failed and
24. This was true in all six of the cases which have occurred over the Court's his-
tory. See chart A supra.
25. W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: (THE EARLY YEARS) THE AUTOBIOG-
RAPHY OF WiLUAM 0. DOUGLAS 449 (1974).
26. C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD, CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAw 44 (1969).
27. D. McHargue, Appointments to the Supreme Court 1789-1932 342, May 1949
(unpublished thesis in University of California, Los Angeles Library).
28. W. KING, supra note 5, at 227-29.
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the Brewer-Field-McKenna deal was consummated with the latter's
appointment to the Supreme Court.
Needless to say, the success of these "deals" depends upon the
willingness of all the actors involved to participate. One fascinating
instance, in which one of the participants ultimately refused to do so,
involved the planned nomination of Joseph Bradley to the Court in a
"deal" arranged by his friend, George Harding, who thought he had
obtained the aged Justice Robert Grier's agreement to resign from the
bench in Bradley's favor. But Grier backed out at the last minute and
Bradley had to await the creation of an additional seat on the Court
under the Reorganization Act of 1869.29
Intense Lobbying
There are numerous cases on record in which a justice has actively
promoted a candidate almost in the manner of a manager during a
political campaign. As alluded to earlier, this is the sort of pressure
which Chief Justice Taft exerted so skillfully on behalf of and/or
against candidates to the Court.3" Professor Danelski's examination of
the Pierce Butler nomination provides an excellent account of the type
of pressure activities Taft undertook with alacrity, because of what he
regarded as his unique expertise and position on the bench.31 Taft, the
champion lobbyist for his own point of view, succeeded admirably.
On occasion, intense lobbying has taken the form of collective
action on the part of several justices and it has usually been crowned
with success. Such was the case in 1853 when all of the sitting justices
wrote individual letters to President Pierce on behalf of John A. Camp-
bell's appointment to the vacancy resulting from the death of Associate
Justice McKinley. Justices Catron and Curtis were designated as the
Court's personal emissaries to deliver the missives.32
A variety of possible reasons may underlie intense lobbying efforts
by justices. First, as was true of Taft, the justice may be so firmly
convinced that he knows what is best for the Court that he sees no
reason to be subtle in his approach. Alternatively, he may see the
29. The intriguing story of this attempt at arranging a successor deal is well told
in Fairman, Mr. Justice Bradley's Appointment to the Supreme Court and the Legal
Tender Cases, 54 HARV. L. REv. 977 (1941).
30. See note 7 supra.
31. D. DANELSKi, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE Is APPOINTED passim (1964).
32. See R. NIcHOLs, FRANKLIN PIERCE: YOUNG HICKORY OF THE GRANITE Hnis
253 (1931); H. O'CoNNOR, JoHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL 17 (1920); C. SwisHER, ROGER
B. TANEY 446 (1935).
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appointment as a challenge to his own personal power and ability to
help guide, if not control, the Court's activities. Such seems to have
been the motivation for Associate Justice Samuel Miller's intense efforts
to have his brother-in-law, William Pitt Ballinger, and Federal District
Court Judge Henry Clay Caldwell placed on the bench.3" On occasion
the vacant position itself is such a crucial one that it breaks down all of
the justices' normal compunctions about becoming involved in what is,
after all, a highly political selection process. This clearly has been a
motivation for the intense lobbying efforts by justices on behalf of
aspirants to the chief justiceship. It was markedly true of attempts to
influence the filling of the vacancy by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney's
death in 1864.3' The crucialness of the vacancy has motivated justices
to intercede, with varying degrees of emphasis, in almost every vacancy
of the center chair since 1864, and in more than one instance it has
given rise to rather nasty internecine warfare among the members of the
Court. For example, witness the unedifying struggle to succeed Stone in
1946. 85
A final motivation may be found in the generally vigorous resolve
by the pressuring justice to secure the appointment of colleagues with a
similar personal and judicial Weltanschaung. Since factions almost
always abound on the high bench, it is not at all unusual for a president
to receive understandably diverse recommendations, occasionally resem-
bling political convention nominating proceedings. Such was the case
in the famous and fascinating example of the nomination of Judge
Cardozo to replace retiring Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.3" Justice
Stone was so intent on securing Cardozo's elevation to the Court that,
when faced with President Hoover's geographical objection to appoint-
ing a third New Yorker to the Court (Hughes and Stone were also from
33. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 2, at 338-40, 349-62.
34. In this instance the Court split behind different candidates. Part of the Court,
sending Justice Davis as their emissary to President Lincoln, favored the elevation of
Associate Justice Swayne, and the other part of the Court favored the appointment of
Salmon P. Chase. Associate Justices Field and Miller were originally part of the Swayne
contingent, but later switched and notified Lincoln of their support for Chase. See C.
FAiRMAN, 1 RECONSTRUCTION AND RE NION, 1864-1888 (1971) (part of the Oliver
Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Court); H. Foom, CASKET OF REMINISCENCES
413-14 (1974); D. SILVER, LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 190-201 (1956).
35. Several of the associate justices are credited with preventing by their actions
(including threats of resignation) the elevation of certain of their brother justices during
President Truman's consideration of candidates to replace the deceased Chief Justice
Stone. See J. FRANK, MR. JusTc BLACK: THE MAN AND His OPINIONS 124-27 (1949);
E. GERHAR, AMEmcA's ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON chapter 16 (1958); M. Pusay,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 801-02 (1951).
36. Carmen, supra note 8, passim.
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the Empire State), Stone offered to resign in Cardozo's favor.17  What
is not so widely known is that opposing both Stone and the acclamation
of almost the entire American legal profession were none other than six
of the sitting Supreme Court Justices, including Chief Justice Hughes,
who objected to the appointment of a confessed "liberal" to the Court.
The six undertook an active campaign which included letters and a
personal visit by the chief justice to the president, even before Holmes
had resigned, pleading that "a majority" of the Court supported Attor-
ney General William Mitchell-a candidate, however, who did not
really want the post. 8 Stone, in turn, became so worried about the
nomination that he worked actively toward the rejection of other candi-
dates under consideration by the president, even to the extent of having
his law clerk prepare a detailed report on the opinions of lower court
Judge Orie Phillips.3 9 Still, while Cardozo was eventually selected, there
is doubt as to Justice Stone's actual impact on his nomination. A good
case can be made for the contention that Senator William E. Borah of
Idaho was far more influential in pressuring Hoover into making Cardo-
zo's appointment.4 °
It is axiomatic that such intensive pressure by justices may well
turn out to be counterproductive. For example, when Justice James
Byrnes resigned from the Court in 1942, his colleague, Felix Franfurter,
undertook a very elaborate campaign to secure the elevation of the
distinguished Judge Learned Hand of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit.4 ' In addition to numerous phone calls,
letters and personal visits to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, he suc-
ceeded in enlisting the support of Chief Justice Stone in his endeavor.
42
F.D.R. evidently became annoyed with these judicial efforts to influence
his selection-perhaps because he chose to become annoyed-and se-
37. A. MASON, supra note 12, at 336. However, Murphy, note 23 supra, doubts
that this offer was given seriously.
38. Justice Van Devanter, when faced with the repeated refusals of the attorney
general to express an interest in the position attributed this behavior to modesty on the
part of Mitchell and worked even harder to realize his goal. Carmen, supra note 8,
at 637-39.
39. A. MASON, supra note 12, at 336.
40. Murphy, supra note 23, at 652, notes that although Justice Frankfurter gave
credit for the nomination of Cardozo to Justice Stone at the time, he later changed his
mind. See also H. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 192; C. JOHNSON, BORAH OF IDAHO 452
(1936).
41. ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945 671-75
(M. Freedman ed. 1967).
42. A. MASON, supra note 12, at 592-93.
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lected Wiley Rutledge instead.43 The president specifically pointed to
Hand's advanced age at the time of the appointment-a position consist-
ent with his criticism of aged justices in the Court Packing Fight of
1937.11 Still, the suspicion that Roosevelt's strongly negative reaction
may have been elicited by the persistently strong pressures of Frankfurter
and Stone is supported by the knowledge that F.D.R. had evinced the
same negative reaction to then Associate Justice Stone's warm efforts on
behalf of Felix Frankfurter to replace Associate Justice Cardozo in




It is possible to summarize generally the different methods of
lobbying by differentiating between the particular stages of the process
at which the justices enter the pressure fray. If a justice enters too late,
he may well have no effect at all, even if his particular candidate
happens to be selected. Chart "D" represents an attempt to order these
methods on the time dimension.
Although it has been theorized that entrance at the Senate confir-
mation stage would be of almost no import because of the tardiness of
the hour,47 there is evidence that efforts have been made by justices in
instances of clearly troublesome confirmation proceedings. The confir-
mation battles involving nominees Taney and, more than a century later,
Haynsworth and Carswell, all resulting in rejections of presidential
nominees, provide at least some evidence of involvement by sitting
justices.48 In the seven attempts on record at that stage, four were
crowned with success. 49 The relatively small number of these efforts
reflects the unlikelihood of the justices' triumph at that advanced level of
the appointment process.
43. F. HAE , JUsTcE RurTDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION 23-25 (1965).
44. Roosevelt wrote to Frankfurter: "[S]ometimes a fellow gets estopped by his
own words and his own deeds-and it is not fun for the fellow himself when that
happens." ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFuRTER, supra note 41, at 674.
45. H. THOMAS, FELIx FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 36 (1960).
46. Perhaps the strong bond of friendship between these two men overrode such
annoyance.
47. Joel Grossman is an advocate of this theory. See J. GROsSMAN, LAWYERS AND
JuDES: THE ABA AND THE PRocEss oF JTJDICiAL SELECTnON 43-45 (1965).
48. See chart A supra.
49. Id.
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CHART "D"
TIME LINE METHODS OF PRESSURE USED





General Letter of Recommendation
Personal Visit by Justice
Consultation and Request for
Information by President
Intense Lobbying
CHOICE ARRIVED AT BY PRESIDENT
Approval of Justice Requested





Any conclusions regarding the actual degree of success that justices
have achieved by exerting influence on a president's choice of Supreme
Court nominees are necessarily highly speculative. Chart "E" repre-
sents a simple numerical box score of the number of sponsored candi-
dates achieving nomination. However, the mere fact that the justice's
candidate was nominated in no way indicates that the justice was
instrumental in that individual's selection. The effort by a justice is,
after all, just one of several different influences which interact and affect
the selection made by the president5" who of course may ignore some or
even all of these pressures. Actually, the success of the justices' influ-
ence may be somewhat greater than the chart indicates, for seven
nominees who ultimately attained the Court-Bradley, Woods, Lurton
(twice), Sutherland, Moody, J.R. Lamar and Cardozo-had been rec-
50. H. ABRA Am, supra note 1, passim.
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CHART "E"
SUMMARY OF EFFORTS BY JUSTICES
TO INFLUENCE SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE






ommended by sitting or retired justices for earlier vacancies for which
they were not then selected. 51 Nonetheless, the sixty-five percent over-
all success rate is indeed impressive.
Justices are apparently much more successful when they endeavor
to exercise a veto in the appointment process than when they act
affirmatively, although the incidents of affirmative action are far more
numerous than negative action.- Another observation which can be
made is that, despite many rumors of active self-generated candidates by
sitting associate justices for elevation to the chief justiceship, only one
such case is in fact demonstrable and it is a marginal one.52 Our
research indicates that the nature of the described pressure is self-
perpetuating: recipients of successful efforts by sitting justices are
prone to repay the favor in the instance of future candidates to the
Court. The major conclusion emerging from this study, however, is that
the influence of sitting and retired justices in the selection of future
members of the Supreme Court is indubitably far more extensive than
had heretofore been believed. It is a political fact of life that can no
longer be ignored in any attempt to detail and analyze the fascinating,
complex process of selecting nominees to serve as justices of the Su-
preme Court of the United States.
51. See chart A supra.
52. Here Associate Justice Swayne used the offices of Senator James Garfield to
attempt to remind President Grant in 1873 that he had earlier been promised elevation
to the chief justiceship. C. MAGRATH, MomUsoN R. WArim: Tim TkaipH OF CnARAC-
TR 7 (1963); D. McHargue, Appointments to the Supreme Court 1789-1932 77, May
1949 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in University of California, Los Angeles Library).
76 46 60%
18 15 83%
94 61 65%

